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The Alienation of Americans 
from their Public Schools 
Ned Fuller* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Religion and public education are perhaps the two most 
pervasive facets of American life. The Supreme Court has 
consistently interpreted the First Amendment to mean that 
these two areas should not intersect. The difficulty is in the 
application of the First Amendment to everyday life. 
Unfortunately, yet understandably, the Supreme Court has 
complicated this process by failing to give an exact definition of 
religion. Such a definition may be impossible to ascertain. A 
definition too broad excludes much of what is necessary to a 
viable society and leads to anarchy; a definition too narrow 
constrains the conscience of one person while establishing the 
religion of another. America's pluralistic nature accentuates 
this problem. This paper will analyze the Court's attempts at 
resolving the delicate balance of maintaining an effective public 
school system that neither alienates nor establishes one 
religious group over another. 
In order to understand a public school system's 
effectiveness, one must first know what a public school system 
should effect, thus, part II of this paper will discuss the 
purposes of public schools and how the Supreme Court has 
applied the Establishment Clause to help accomplish those 
purposes. Part III will analyze the federal courts' application of 
the Establishment Clause in the context of classroom 
curriculum, bible reading and school prayer. Additionally, Part 
III will address the effectiveness of the federal court's approach 
concluding that the court's failure to adequately define religion 
has not prevented the establishment of religion, has alienated a 
segment of society and has failed to assist the schools in 
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accomplishing their primary objectives. Part IV of this paper 
will discuss how to improve on the Court's analyses. This 
section will suggest that because defining religion is so 
difficult, the Court should revise what constitutes 
establishment and incorporate a coercion standard such as that 
used in freedom of speech analyses. 
II. THE PURPOSE OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE. 
One of the most important goals of the public school 
system is to provide societal cohesion. The Supreme Court has 
stated that the public school system is "the most pervasive 
means for promoting our common destiny."1 The difficulty is in 
defining that destiny. During the Colonial period of American 
history, there existed a common assumption that the purpose of 
life was to promote Christian faith. 2 It is not surprising, 
therefore, to find that the first form of public schools in 
America originated in Massachusetts for the purpose of 
assisting children in learning to read the Bible. 3 The 
legislation requiring the establishment of these first schools 
stated: 
It being one chief project of the old deluder, Satan to keep 
man from the knowledge of the Scriptures .... It is therefore 
ordered, that every township in this jurisdiction, after the 
Lord hath increased them to the number of fifty householders, 
shall then forthwith appoint one within their town to teach 
all such children as shall resort to him to write and read ... 
and it is further ordered, that where any town shall increase 
to the number of one hundred families or householders they 
shall set up a grammar school.4 
Beginning with these first public schools and into the 
Eighteenth Century, public and private schools taught from a 
religious perspective,5 apparently to promote a common 
1. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) 
(opinion of J. Frankfurter) (cited with approval in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 
578, 584 (1987)). 
2. ROCKNE MCCARTHY, et al., SOCIETY, STATE AND SCHOOLS 80 (1981) 
[hereinafter SOCIETY]. 
3. !d. 
4. R. MCMILLAN, REUGION IN THE PUBUC ScHOOLS 78-9 (1984) (footnote 
omitted). 
5. C. MOEHLMAN, SCHOOL AND CHURCH: THE AMERICAN WAY 28 (2 ed. 1944); 
• 
1 
87] ALIENATION FROM PUBLIC SCHOOLS 89 
destiny of Christian conversion. Thus, there was no reason to 
distinguish public and private schools in the administration of 
public funds. The rationale was that private schools provided a 
public service to the community. 
Mter the Revolutionary War, however, the sense of 
common destiny and the purpose of public schooling began to 
change. The public educational system was seen as a way to 
instill and develop those characteristics necessary to perpetuate 
and advance a democratic society. The First Congress passed 
the Northwest Ordinance which stated in article three, 
"[r ]eligion, morality and knowledge being necessary to a good 
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the 
means of education shall forever be encouraged."6 The 
Northwest Ordinance evidences the subtle, yet, important shift 
from schooling for spiritual growth purposes to schooling for 
civil stability purposes. 
This change may have resulted from the pragmatic effect of 
pluralism. The new states recognized the need for religious 
instruction but were hesitant to allow the tenets of "other 
sects" to be taught. 7 R. Freeman Butts, as reported by 
McMillan, observes: 
With few exceptions the major Protestant denominations 
turned more and more to the idea of a nonsectarian common 
school. This was sometimes the result of weariness with 
sectarian ideological disputes, sometimes in recognition of the 
added expense of independent denominational effort, 
sometimes of the need for counteraction against the Catholic 
threat, and sometimes of a genuine belief in the priority of 
political community as the goal of training in common 
citizenship. 8 
Thus the pragmatic effect of pluralism was that the needs and 
desires of each sect would negate the other. If religious 
indoctrination remained the sole aim of education, the public 
schools, failing to agree on one sect, would fail. However, as the 
Northwest Ordinance evidences, the religious aim of schooling 
was replaced, at least to some degree, with the aim of 
see James E. Woods, Jr., Religion and the Public Scfwols, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 349 
(1986). 
6. ADLER, E'l' AL., THE ANNALS OF AMERICA, 3:194-5 (1968). 
7. MCMILLAN, supra note 4 at 81. 
8. ld. at 82. 
... 
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promoting democratic principles. Thus schooling was seen as a 
means of preserving a common destiny of self-government. 
Promoting democratic principles did not mean that religion 
needed to be absolutely excluded. Instead, religion was viewed 
as a necessary component of "good government." Moreover, 
schooling was seen as a means of transferring religion, as well 
as morality and knowledge, in order to maintain a "good 
government and the happiness of mankind."9 Religion's 
necessity to a good government is reflected in Benjamin 
Franklin's words: 
But think how great a Proportion of Mankind consists of 
weak and ignorant Men and Women, and of inexperienc'd and 
inconsiderate Youth of both Sexes, who have need of the 
Motives of Religion to restrain them from Vice, to support 
their Virtue and retain them in the practice of it until it 
becomes habitual, which is the great Point for its Security 
.... If men are so wicked as we now see them with religion, 
what would they be without it. 10 
Likewise, George Washington concluded that, "[o]f all the 
dispositions and habits, which lead to political prosperity, 
religion and morality are indispensable supports. . . . It is 
substantially true, that virtue or morality is a necessary spring 
of popular government."11 John Adams added, "[o]ur 
Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It 
is wholly inadequate to the government of any other."12 
Finally, Thomas .Jefferson posed this query: "Can the liberties 
of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only 
firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these 
liberties are the gift of God? That they are not to be violated 
but with His wrath?"13 
Indeed, the importance of religion is not lost on those 
battling for the public school curriculum. As the sense of 
society's destiny changed, few, if any, advocated the complete 
eradication of religion from the public schools. A more accurate 
characterization of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century 
debates regarding public school curriculum is that the 
9. ADLER, supra note 6. 
10. RICHARD VE'ITERLI AND GARY BRYNER, IN SEARCH OF THE REPUBLIC 69 
(1987) (emphasis in the original) (footnote omitted). 
11. ld. at 69-70. 
12. Id. at 70. 
13. ld. at 105. I 
I 
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nonsectarian goal was to loosen the sectarian control over the 
public schools. One commentator has noted that Horace Mann, 
a stalwart supporter of nonsectarian schools, "approved of Bible 
reading and other nonsectarian religious exercises in the public 
school."14 Mueller continues, 
[t]he McGuffey Readers, which for so long set the tone of 
public-school education, were almost sermonic in style and 
content. The public school teacher was expected to be as much 
an exemplar of morality as was the clergyman. It was 
common practice to recruit public school teachers and 
administrators from among graduates of seminaries and 
denominational colleges. 15 
Though the common destiny had changed from that of creating 
Zion to that of ensuring democracy, religion's role in the public 
schools, while no longer central, was universally recognized. 
Hindsight clarifies the debate over public school 
curriculum. On the one hand, most, if not all, agree that 
education is necessary to the progress of a democratic society. 
Additionally, most, if not all, agree that some moral cohesion is 
also necessary to democratic stability and this moral cohesion 
can be found among the rudiments of religion. Yet, if religion is 
to be taught, what religious morals, or whose religious tenets 
are necessary to the overall cohesion of society? As a practical 
matter not all religious teachings can be integrated in the 
classroom curriculum. However, if religion per se is excluded 
that may undermine the principles of democracy the school 
system seeks to further. 
Thomas Jefferson found an answer to this dilemma in the 
creation of a civil religion. Jefferson agreed that the 
divisiveness of sectarian religions would disrupt society unless 
privatized. 16 However, without some common public morality 
republicanism would fail. 17 Thus, Jefferson advocated the 
teaching of a universal religion that would be accepted by all 
because the truthfulness of its tenets was self-evident. 18 These 
tenets were: "1. That there is one only God, and He all perfect. 
14. Arnold Mueller, Religion in the Public Schools, in CHURCH AND STATE 
UNDER GoD 300, 301 (1964). 
15. ld. 
16. SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 83. 
17. ld. 
18. ld. 
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2. That there is a future state of rewards and punishments. 3. 
That to love God with all thy heart and neighbor as thyself, is 
the sum of religion."19 Jefferson further advocated, in 
proposing the blueprints for religious study at the University of 
Virginia, that a professor of ethics be responsible for teaching 
the "proofs of the being of God" and that religious sects be 
permitted to use the University's facilities to teach their 
doctrine.20 Jefferson reasoned that "[b]y bringing the sects 
together, and mixing them with the mass of other students, we 
shall soften their asperities, liberalize and neutralize their 
prejudices and make the general religion a religion of peace, 
reason, and morality."21 
In effect, Jefferson sought to resolve the problem through 
eradicating the divisiveness of the sects by distilling them to 
their essence. This essence, Jefferson contended, is what binds 
society together. 22 In addition, all religions share this essence 
and therefore no one religion is preferred over another. In a 
society which, religiously speaking, is fairly homogenous 
Jefferson's analysis might ring true. Yet, it is clear there must 
be a near unanimous consensus that the tenets are "self-
evident" if Jefferson's reasoning is to withstand practical 
application. In fact, at least one commentator has suggested 
that Jefferson simply advanced his sect, Deism, through 
characterizing it in a manner pleasing to the religious palates 
of the time.23 
In general, before, during and after the ratification of the 
First Amendment,24 public schools were seen as an 
environment friendly to religion. Indeed, religion was viewed as 
necessary to accomplish the purpose for which public schools 
were organized, whether that be religious inculcation or 
societal stability. However, the problems caused by the 
plurality's assessment of religion's role in public education, as a 
practical matter, were confronted even at a time when society 
was much more homogenous than it is today. 
19. VETTERU supra note 9, at 102. 
20. J. RANDOLPH, EARLY HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, AS 
CONTAINED IN THE LETTERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JOSEPH C. CABELL 441 
(1856). 
21. P. FORD, ED., THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 12:272 (1892-99). 
22. VETTERU, supra note 9, at 102. 
23. SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 83-84. 
24. Requiring, inter alia, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 
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In 1963, the Supreme Court defined the common goal of 
the public schools as the "preservation of a democratic system 
of government."25 The Court also recognized that sectarianism 
is a divisive force capable of impeding the public school 
system.26 Through the incorporation doctrine, the Supreme 
Court applies the Establishment Clause to issues of religion 
and education in order to prevent the divisiveness of 
sectarianism.27 The Court attempts to do this without diluting 
the effectiveness of the public schools to provide for society's 
common destiny. They are not always successful. 
The Supreme Court, in 194 7, declared that the First 
Amendment Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses were 
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 28 This has the practical effect of 
reshaping the religion/education debate. The primary concern is 
no longer whether sectarianism is too divisive or how to best 
promote civic virtue. Today's issue is whether or not a public 
school's activity "establishes religion" or prohibits the free 
exercise of religion. As the cases demonstrate, however, this is 
often difficult to resolve given the public school's goal of 
promoting a democratic society. One must continually consider 
at what point moral tenets become religion rather than simply 
a reflection of cultural mores. 
Initially, the Supreme Court defmed "establishment" as 
any interaction between church and state that breached the 
"wall of separation"29 built by the First Amendment.30 In 
Everson the Supreme Court considered whether or not a 
statute allowing local school boards to reimburse parents of 
children attending both public and parochial schools 
25. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring); See supra note 1 and surrounding text. 
26. Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) 
(opinion of J. Frankfurter) (stating that "[i]n no activity of the state is it more 
vital to keep out divisive forces than the schools) (cited with approval in Edwards 
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987)). 
27. Id. 
28. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
29. The use of Jefferson's metaphor to exclude religion from the public schools 
is somewhat disingenuous. Those who offer this standard for constitutional 
interpretation must think Jefferson an incredible hypocrite to support such strict 
separation on the federal level and then propose public schools which provide, 
perhaps even require religious indoctrination on the state level. For further 
discussion see DALLIN H. OAKS, THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (1963). 
30. Everson 330 U.S. at 1. 
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"established" religion.31 Justice Black writing for the majority 
stated: 
[t]he "establishment of religion" clause of the First 
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the 
Federal government can set up a church. Neither can pass 
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person 
to go or to remain away from church against his will or force 
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person 
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious 
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. 
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support 
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be 
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice 
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, 
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious 
organizations or groups and vice versa.32 
Despite this emphatic separationist language the Court found 
that the New Jersey statute did not violate the Constitution 
because the statute was designed to benefit the child rather 
than the parochial school. 33 
After Everson the Supreme Court maintained a strict 
separationist line, holding unconstitutional a program of 
release time for religious study in a public school.34 Four 
years later, the Court weakened its hardline approach in 
Zorach v. Clauson 35 finding a released-time plan 
constitutional when, unlike McCollum, the religious instruction 
occurred off the public school grounds. 36 The Court reasoned 
that this plan was simply an accommodation of public 
schedules to the needs of religious citizens.37 The importance 
of the Court's opinion in Zorach is that it signals the Court's 
recognition that a wall may be incapable, in practical 
application, of dividing such integrally related spheres as 
church and state. The Court, in Zorach, appears to recognize 
that the religion clauses, similar to other rights provided in the 
Constitution, cannot be applied in an absolute manner. The 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 15-16. 
33. ld. 
34. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
35. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
36. Id. at 315. 
37. Id. 
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Court was concerned that the religion clauses not be 
interpreted in a way hostile to religion. Thus, the Court 
introduced an accommodationist approach to the Establishment 
Clause that would allow for the proposition that "[ w ]e are a 
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being."38 
However, the Zorach rationale was construed narrowly in 
later cases as the Supreme Court held state prescribed 
prayer39 and voluntary Bible reading40 unconstitutional in 
the public schools. The Court in Schempp articulated a 
definition for establishment which essentially stated that, if 
either the purpose or primary effect of the enactment is the 
advancement or inhibition of religion, then the enactment is 
unconstitutional.41 Thus, a statute establishes religion if it 
has no secular purpose, or if it has the primary effect of 
advancing or inhibiting religion. In Lemon v. Kurtzman42 the 
Court reaffirmed this test with an additional condition that the 
statute not create excessive entanglement between Church and 
State.43 
Until the Lemon test the Supreme Court applied a strict 
wall of separation analysis to activities alleged to establish a 
religion. The Court reasoned that the "first and most 
immediate purpose [of the Establishment Clause] rested on the 
belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy 
government and degrade religion."44 However, the Court did 
acknowledge, at least in one case, that the principle of 
separation was not an independent guideline and the 
accommodation of religion did not per se amount to an 
establishment of religion.45 Since Lemon the Court has 
maintained a strict separation mentality while measuring 
establishment against three standards: 1) is there a secular 
purpose for the contested statute? 2) does the statute advance 
or inhibit religion? and 3) does the statute cause an excessive 
entanglement with religion? 
38. !d. at 313. 
39. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1961). 
40. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
41. !d. at 222. 
42. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
43. !d. at 612-613. 
44. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431. 
45. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312. 
. 
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Unfortunately, in applying the Lemon test the Court has 
often forgotten its goal of preventing an establishment of 
religion, consequently creating in the classroom an atmosphere 
of hostility and intolerance towards religion. Two primary 
problems exist with the Court's application of the Lemon test: 
1) the Court assumes that a "secular" purpose is nonreligious 
without defining secularism, and 2) the Court assumes that an 
advancement, inhibition or entanglement with religion 
necessarily establishes religion. A review of court decisions 
involving religion and education will illustrate these concems. 
III. .APPLYING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS. 
A. Classroom Curriculum 
The Supreme Court has decided two major cases involving 
classroom curriculum; both involve the evolutionary theory of 
human origin. In Epperson v. Arkansas46 the Court held un-
constitutional a state statute forbidding instruction in the pub-
lic schools regarding the theory of evolution. While this case 
was decided before the Lemon test was fully developed, the Su-
preme Court stated that establishment is determined by 
whether the primary purpose or effect of the legislation is the 
advancement or inhibition of religion.47 
In deciding that the purpose of the Arkansas statute was 
religious, the Court failed to define what constitutes religion or 
what would make the law secular. The majority's only guidance 
is that "there can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to 
prevent its teachers from discussing the theory of evolution 
because it is contrary to the belief of some that the Book of 
Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to the ori-
gin of man."48 The Court offers no evidence that this is true 
except that the law is similar to a Tennessee law that was 
couched in more religious language.49 Failure to define the 
religion-secularism distinction assumes ipso facto that tradi-
tional creation is religious and modem evolution is secular. 
As Justice Black points out in his concurring opinion, the 
Court has failed to address whether "forbidding a State to 
46. 393 u.s. 97 (1968). 
47. ld. at 107. 
48. ld. 
49. ld. 
l 
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exclude the subject of evolution from its schools infringes the 
religious freedom of those who consider evolution an anti-reli-
gious doctrine."50 In other words, the Court forbids inhibiting 
the instruction of evolution, a principle many feel is inapposite 
to traditional religion. This, at best, constitutionalizes hostility 
toward religion in the public classroom and, at worst, estab-
lishes a religion professing evolution over a religion professing 
creation. To resolve this conflict the Court must clarify the line 
between religion and secularism. Otherwise, the Court, as 
Justice Black notes, is "simply ... [writing] off as pure non-
sense the views of those who consider evolution an anti-reli-
gious doctrine."51 
The religion-secularism distinction is amplified in Edwards 
v. Aguillard. 52 In Aguillard the Supreme Court held unconsti-
tutional a Louisiana statute requiring that if evolution is 
taught then creation science must also be taught. The Court 
followed the Lemon test and inquired whether the legislature 
had a valid secular purpose for enacting this law. 
The Court failed, however, to explicitly define religion or 
secularism. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, ex-
plained that a religious intent exists if the legislature promotes 
a particular sect or promotes religion in general.53 This, of 
course, begs the question, what is a sect or what is religion in 
general. The definition of religion may be found in the evidence 
the Court uses to hold that a religious purpose exists. 
One item of evidence the Court uses to indict the legisla-
tive purpose is the finding that creation science leads one to 
the conclusion that a Supreme Creator exists.54 Thus, one 
characteristic of religion may be a belief in the existence of a 
Supreme Creator. This cannot be determinative, however, since 
the Court did not rule that the teaching of creation science is 
per se unconstitutional. 55 Likewise, it contradicts the Court's 
earlier rulings that religion does not require a Supreme Cre-
ator to invoke First Amendment protection. 56 
50. !d. at 113 (Black, J., concurring). 
51. !d. at 113. 
52. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
53. !d. at 585. 
54. !d. at 591-2. 
55. !d. at 587. 
56. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 
U.S. 488 (1962); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). 
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The Court also inferred that religious motivation must 
exist because historically, certain religions opposed evolu-
tion.57 Thus, whether a view is religious may depend on how 
history has defined that view. This is a fairly dangerous crite-
ria since it would exclude "modern" religions from constitution-
al protection. Moreover, it is unhelpful because the Court fails 
to expand on what historical criteria are used to distinguish be-
tween religious and secular precepts. 
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, hints at the crite-
ria necessary to define something as secular. He explains that 
although "the statute is limited to the scientific evidences sup-
porting the theory [this] does not render its purpose secu-
lar .... Whatever the academic merit of particular subjects or 
theories, the Establishment Clause limits the discretion of 
state officials to pick and choose among them for the purpose of 
promoting a particular religious belief."58 Thus, Justice Powell 
requires more than scientific evidence to prove something is 
secular. Secularism, according to Justice Powell, requires that 
the science not be used to promote a particular religious belief. 
Yet, there is no real evidence to support that Arkansas used 
creation science to support a religious belief. 
Justice Powell's reasoning helps to winnow out the contra-
dictions inherent in the Court's approach to the Establishment 
Clause in education-related cases. If the Court does not define 
what constitutes a religious belief, then a religious belief is 
whatever anyone desires. For example, a secular humanist will 
find the teaching in public school of any concept which leads to 
a belief in a Supreme Creator as unconstitutionally establish-
ing a religion of deism. Likewise, a fundamentalist Christian 
will find any teaching which leads to a belief that mortality is 
the end of existence as unconstitutionally establishing a reli-
gion of atheism. 
Clearly, this reasoning survives when applied to the 
majority's analysis in Aguillard. The Court in Aguillard finds 
that creation-science is offered to promote the belief that a 
Supreme Creator exists. This promotion is evident, the Court 
reasons, from the background of those who support creation-
science and the obvious conclusion that a Supreme Creator 
exists which one must infer if creation-science is true. Because 
the existence of a Supreme Creator is clearly a religious pre-
57. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 591. 
58. !d. at 604 (Powell, J., concurring). 
l 
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cept, the state's support of creation-science to advance this 
precept is an establishment of religion. However, one could 
invalidate evolution through the same analysis. 
Evolution, the argument begins, is offered to promote the 
belief that man is alone in the universe. This promotion is 
evident from the secular humanists, atheists and agnostics who 
support evolution and from the natural conclusion one must 
infer if evolution is true. One might object claiming that one 
could also conclude that a Supreme Creator through evolution 
made the universe.59 However, this is still a religious belief. 
Either way, evolution is used to support a religious tenet. 
Again, one might object, explaining that evolution, unlike cre-
ation-science, is not provided to support the belief which may 
be its logical conclusion. Nonetheless, evolution does support a 
religious belief even though it is not intended. Under Lemon an 
effect of establishing religion violates the Constitution though 
the violator did not intend that effect.60 Also, the purpose for 
teaching evolution would then be to obtain knowledge. Without 
guidelines it is unclear why knowledge is a secular pursuit. 
Indeed, a major tenet of Christianity is that truth will set one 
free. 61 The only difference between evolution and creationism 
is that one traditionally has been associated with "religion" 
while the other has not. An analysis of lower court decisions 
will substantiate this reasoning. 
The Sixth Circuit determined that the plaintiff-parents had 
no right to remove their children from a program which the 
parents viewed as establishing a religion of human secular-
ism.62 In Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education the 
plaintiffs are seven families who object to the teaching of mate-
rial the parents find offensive to their religious beliefs. 63 The 
plaintiffs claim that requiring their children to read and dis-
cuss literature that promotes evolution, secular humanism, 
futuristic supernaturalism, magic and false views of death 
violates the First Amendment's free exercise clause. The Court, 
applying a standard of coercion, found that absent some re-
59. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 591 n.11. 
60. ld. at 583. 
61. John 8:32. 
62. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
63. ld. at 1060-1. 
... 
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quirement of acquiescence or participation no violation had oc-
curred.64 
It is important to note that in this case, unlike Epperson 
and Aguillard, the plaintiffs are claiming a violation of the 
First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and not a violation of 
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Nonetheless, the 
Court rejected a "balancing'' approach to the plaintiffs' dilemma 
because this would violate the Establishment Clause.65 This 
reasoning leads to some complex definitional quandaries. 
The Sixth Circuit rejected the district court's suggestion 
that the school district should balance the "offensive" material 
with material which correlates with the parents' views.66 The 
Sixth Circuit presented two reasons for this rejection: 1) the 
balance would be impossible, and 2) such a balance would vio-
late the Establishment Clause.67 The Court reasoned that the 
balance would be impossible because the plaintiffs' views in-
cluded intolerance for any view that undermined plaintiffs' 
philosophy. The Court acknowledges, however, that testimony 
was presented "that an occasional reference to ... objectionable 
concepts would be acceptable."68 It was the repeated and unre-
futed references which constituted the plaintiff's contention of 
Constitutional violation.69 Thus, the Court's claim of impossi-
bility is unwarranted. 
The Court also worried that any balancing would violate 
the Establishment Clause. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that "the 
Supreme Court has clearly held that it violates the Establish-
ment Clause to tailor a public school's curriculum to satisfy the 
principles or prohibitions of any religion."70 The Court fails to 
define what constitutes religion. Conceivably, the plaintiffs felt 
that secularism, supernaturalism and the other "isms" were 
religions. Surely, the Establishment Clause cannot be read to 
allow "tailoring" to one set of religions while excluding another 
set. It is highly ironic that the courts forbid the mention of 
Christianity in a textbook in order to counterbalance the repeti-
tious references to other religions because to do so "would lead 
64. Id. at 1063-4. 
65. Id. at 1064-5. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 1064. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968). 
l 
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to a forbidden entanglement of the public schools in religious 
matters.'m The Sixth Circuit is not alone in its schizophrenia. 
The Seventh Circuit has forbidden the teaching of creation-
science as a violation of the Establishment Clause.72 In Web-
ster v. New Lenox School District the plaintiff was a school 
teacher who countered the teaching of evolution with the teach-
ing of creation science. Some students objected to this as a 
violation of the Establishment Clause. The school district su-
perintendent relied on Aguillard and directed the plaintiff, Ray 
Webster, to cease teaching creation-science because the "teach-
ing of this theory had been held by the federal courts to be 
religious advocacy."73 Mr. Webster brought suit claiming cen-
sorship under the First Amendment.74 While it is not clear 
whether the plaintiff raised the issue of establishment, the 
Court clearly accepts as legitimate the superintendent's pro-
fessed concern that the plaintiffs actions violate the Establish-
ment Clause. 
The Seventh Circuit concludes that, "[e]ducators do not 
offend the First Amendment ... so long as their actions are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."75 The 
pedagogical concern is that Mr. Webster's subject matter creat-
ed Establishment Clause violations. 76 The Court failed to ex-
plain how Mr. Webster's actions established a religion. Mr. 
Webster's stated reason for teaching creation-science was to 
"explore alternative viewpoints."77 The Court failed to offer 
any criteria for distinguishing a religious viewpoint from a sec-
ular one. The Court simply held that "the school board has 
successfully navigated the narrow channel between impairing 
intellectual inquiry and propagating a religious creed."78 
There is no explanation of how evidence indicating that the 
Earth is not four billion years old establishes a religious creed. 
Likewise, there is no explanation of why evidence propagating 
the evolution of man is considered secular. The definitional 
problems the Webster case illustrates are even more salient 
71. Id. at 1065. 
72. Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990). 
73. Id. at 1006 (footnote omitted). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 1008 (quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 
27 (1988). 
76. ld. 
77. Id. at 1006. 
78. Id. at 1008. 
1 
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when compared with Moore v. Gaston County Board of Educa-
tion79 
In Moore, the plaintiff, a student teacher, was fired for 
expressing his belief that, inter alia, evolution was a valid 
theory, God did not exist, nor did heaven or hell, and that cer-
tain parts of the Bible could not be taken literally.80 The Dis-
trict Court held that "[ t]o discharge a teacher without warning 
because his answers to scientific and theological questions do 
not fit the notions of the local parents and teachers is a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. It is 
an 'establishment of religion,' the official approval of local or-
thodoxy . . . "81 The Court reasoned that allowing the teacher 
to respond in a manner which comports with those who "com-
plain the loudest" establishes the religion of those complain-
ants.82 
The Court failed to adequately address what constitutes 
religion. The Court indicated that religion is that sphere of life 
which cannot be proved and therefore requires one to walk by 
faith. 83 This is a frail standard by which to judge between the 
religious and the secular. There are times when science re- l 
quires belief in what is not proven.84 Additionally, there are 
myriad instances of "proven" principles being disproved,85 
thus one can rarely know when something is actually proven. 
Even accepting this as a valid distinction, plaintiff's statements 
made in class cannot be proven, all require faith and therefore 
are, according to the Court, religious dogma. Remarkably, the 
Court allows the teacher to discuss personal religious views, 
religious views so offensive to some students that the students 
actually tried to walk out during the discussion.86 Either the 
Court is advocating that teachers be permitted to discuss reli-
gious principles at least when interrogated regarding those 
principles, or the Court is asserting that the plaintiffs views 
79. 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C. 1973). 
80. !d. at 1038. 
81. !d. at 1043. 
82. !d. 
83. !d. 
84. Evolution between species is one example. Science has yet to find the 
"missing link." 
85. Blood-letting as a way to cure disease, the finding of Eve see Begley, Eve 
Takes Another Fall, NEWSWEEK, March 2, 1992, at 58, the make-up of the smallest 
particle and the big-bang theory are also examples of proven scientific principles 
eroding under further study. 
86. !d. at 1038. 
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are non-religious and as in Mozert the school district cannot 
proscribe conduct simply because it is offensive. 
Given the court's concern that, "[r]eligious or scientific 
dogma supported by the power of the state has historically 
brought threat to liberty and often death to the unorthodox ... 
"it is safe to assume that the Court did not feel Mr. Webster's 
views were religious in nature. The Court can reach this con-
clusion because they reason from the premise that Mr. 
Webster's comments amounted to little more than inferences 
from Darwin's theory of evolution and to postpone regarding 
this theory is to postpone education.87 The Court assumes that 
Mr. Webster's statements are not religious without explaining 
why. An analysis of the Bible reading cases further illustrates 
the definitional dilemma arising from the Court's application of 
the Establishment Clause to public schools has caused. 
B. Bible Reading 
One of the earliest Supreme Court cases applying the Es-
tablishment Clause to Bible reading activities is School District 
of Abington Township v. Schempp.88 In Schempp the Court 
consolidated two cases in which the states passed laws requir-
ing Bible reading at the start of each day.89 Attendance at the 
Bible reading sessions was not mandatory, the children took 
turns reading from any version of the Bible they chose, there 
were no comments made, no questions asked and no explana-
tions given.90 The states also required recitation of the Lord's 
prayer at the beginning of each day, though attendance was not 
mandatory.91 Plaintiffs objected to this exercise claiming it 
violated the First Amendment.92 
The Court held that this practice did indeed violate the 
First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The Court reasoned 
that while state power cannot be used to handicap religion, the 
First Amendment requires abstention "from fusing functions of 
Government and of religious sects."93 Additionally, the Court 
explained that "the place of the Bible as an instrument of reli-
87. !d. 
88. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
89. !d. at 205. 
90. ld. at 207. 
91. ld. 
92. ld. 
93. ld. at 219 (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 
203, 227 (1948). 
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gion cannot be gainsaid," thus concluding that this exercise was 
religious in nature and constituted an establishment of religion 
in violation of the First Amendment.94 
The Court again failed to define religion. The Supreme 
Court concluded that reading the Bible itself was not violative 
of the First Amendment, and in fact the Court said, "the Bible 
is worthy of study" for secular purposes.95 Additionally, the 
secular goals set out by defendants, "promotion of moral values, 
the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the 
perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature," 
were not found to be religious.96 Thus, if reading the Bible is 
constitutional and studying morals is constitutional, one can 
only conclude that what is unconstitutional about these exercis-
es is the use of the Bible to promote morals. 
The Court concluded that "even if its purpose is not strictly 
religious, it is sought to be accomplished through readings, 
without comment, from the Bible."97 Moreover, Justice 
Brennan adds, referring to the secular purposes served through 
these exercises, "it would seem that less sensitive materials 
might equally well serve the same purpose."98 Justice 
Brennan concluded that the First Amendment forbids "the use 
of religious means to achieve secular ends where nonreligious 
means will suffice."99 Justice Brennan even suggests that "less 
sensitive means" might be found in speeches and messages of 
great Americans. 100 
What the majority and Justice Brennan fail to explain is 
why these means are less sensitive. For example, one might 
use the Declaration of Independence in order to promote mor-
als. Yet, Jefferson, in this great writing, assumes that inalien-
able rights are endowed by a "creator." Surely those who seek a 
"complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious 
94. !d. at 223-4. 
95. !d. at 225. 
96. !d. at 223-224. 
97. !d. at 224. The Court adds that allowing nonattendance and the use of 
different versions of the Bible contradicts any professed secular purpose. The Court 
fails to explain this reasoning. It would seem that the state is simply acknowledg· 
ing that different versions of the Bible also contain moral teachings and literary 
value, and that some may be offended by these teachings and thus are entitled to 
absent themselves. 
98. !d. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
99. !d. at 280-1. 
100. !d. 
i 
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activity and civil authority"101 would object to Jefferson's sup-
position. If one looks at the speeches and messages of great 
Americans reference to a god or supreme creator are perva-
sive.102 
The Court similarly failed to explain why using the philos-
ophy of a great American to promote morals is not religion but 
using the Bible for the same purpose establishes religion. Some 
will disagree regarding the influence or legitimacy of any his-
torical figure's personal beliefs. If the school requires the study 
of these beliefs to promote morals and contradict the material-
ism of our times, one may question whether this constitutes 
"indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform 
to the prevailing officially approved religion?"103 This ques-
tion is impossible to answer when the Court fails to define 
religion. This contradiction is shown again in Wallace v. 
Jaffree104 in which the Court found unconstitutional a statute 
allowing voluntary prayer in the public schools. 
C. School Prayer 
In Lee v. Weisman 105 the Court held that graduation 
prayers directed by state officials violated the Establishment 
Clause. The majority found that the government involvement 
in religion was pervasive and that the students were forced to 
submit to subtle coercive pressure. 106 The Court displayed the 
type of thinking which leads one to believe that the Court ei-
ther draws its definition of religion too narrowly or fails to 
define religion at all. 
The Court expressed sympathy for a civic religion but bal-
anced that against the principle that "all creeds must be toler-
ated and none favored."107 The Court's analysis sounds good 
but does not work in practice. One can argue coherently that 
"nonprayer" and "nonreligion" are creeds and are favored over 
traditional creeds. The Court states that graduation is "one of 
life's most significant occasions"108 and that the students are 
101. ld. at 217 (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947). 
102. See supra note 9 and surrounding text. 
103. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 221 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-1 
(1962)). 
104. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
105. 120 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1992). 
106. ld. at 480, 484. 
107. ld. at 482-483. 
108. ld. at 486. 
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susceptible to the psychological coercion inherent in maintain-
ing respectful silence.109 Yet, the Court, apparently, believes 
that proscribing prayer at a graduation ceremony does not send 
a message to these students that creeds which engage in 
prayer are not to be tolerated. The court simply cannot have it 
both ways. If students feel this ceremony is one of life's most 
significant occasions, then clearly they will wonder why reli-
gion, an otherwise significant portion of their lives, is affirma-
tively excluded. Moreover, if students are susceptible to the 
psychological coercion of something as cordial as maintaining 
respectful silence, they will obviously be susceptible to the 
direct coercion of an affirmative ban of such a universal symbol 
of religion such as prayer. 
The Court's quandary is highlighted when it tries to ex-
plain why students may be "subjected during the course of 
their educations to ideas deemed offensive and irreligious, but 
[are] denied a brief, formal prayer ceremony that the school 
offers in return."110 The Court points out that this conflict 
confuses the speech and religion clauses of the First Amend-
ment.111 The Court concludes that "[t]he explanation lies in 
the lesson of history that was and is the inspiration for the 
Establishment Clause, the lesson that in the hands of govern-
ment what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious 
views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce."112 
What the Court fails, or refuses, to realize is that history also 
clearly teaches that in the hands of government what might 
begin as a tolerant expression of ANY view may end in a policy 
to indoctrinate and coerce. 113 
In Wallace, an Alabama statute authorizing the public 
school teachers to hold a one-minute period of silence for medi-
tation was amended to include "for meditation or voluntary 
prayer."114 The Court ruled that the addition of the term "vol-
untary prayer" clearly had the religious purpose of advancing 
109. !d. at 484. 
110. !d. at 483. 
111. /d. The court fails to explain why irreligious ideas, which clearly incorpo-
rate atheism, are nonreligious. The mere fact that someone is amoral does not 
mean the person has no moral philosophy. 
112. !d. 
113. A few examples will suffice, the French Revolution, the words of Karl 
Marx, and the reigns of Lenin, Stalin and Hitler. 
114. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40. 
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prayer in the public schools. 115 The Court reasoned that the 
term "meditation" includes prayer and thus the addition of the 
term "voluntary prayer" is either unnecessary or added for the 
purpose of endorsing religion. 116 The Court invalidated a 
third alternative, that the term "voluntary prayer" was added 
to accommodate the free exercise of religious beliefs, because 
there existed no burden prohibiting the exercise of such beliefs. 
This reasoning ignores the acknowledgment made by the Court 
that "for some persons meditation itself may be a form of 
prayer."117 Thus, the addition of "voluntary prayer" may have 
been added to clarify any misperception regarding whether or 
not traditional forms of prayer were permissible. In other 
words, the statute was meant to remove a perceived bur-
den.118 
Regardless of the purpose behind the term "voluntary 
prayer" the Court is hypocritical in its definitions of religion. 
Clearly, the Court ruled that a state cannot set aside a moment 
of silence for the stated purpose of prayer. This, the Court 
reasoned, endorses prayer. 119 However, the Court concludes 
that "[ w ]e do not imply that simple meditation or silence is 
barred from the public schools; we simply hold that the state 
cannot participate in the advancement of religious activities in 
any guise."120 The Court's inference is that the term prayer 
connotes religion but the term meditation or silence does not. 
The term "prayer" added to this statute presumably pushed 
children toward prayer. Incredibly, the term meditation does 
not appear to push a student toward meditation, although the 
Court acknowledged that meditation is a type of prayer. 
Even a moment of silence arguably encourages children to 
meditate or pray. Justice O'Connor suggests that a moment of 
silence is not inherently religious because a child is not re-
quired to join in the prayer and the child is left to his or her 
own thoughts. 121 However, one could reasonably argue that 
requiring children to be silent is endorsing meditation-an activ-
ity that can be characterized as religious. Even if it were true 
that a moment of silence does not establish religious activities 
115. Id. at 59-60. 
116. ld. 
117. ld. at 59 n.47. 
118. ld. at 87 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
119. ld. at 60. 
120. ld. at 48 n.30. 
121. ld. at 72-3 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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because one is not forced or encouraged to participate, this is 
also true of a moment of silent prayer. The Court has defined 
prayer as religious probably because society traditionally con-
siders prayer a religious activity. Yet, the Court defines medi-
tation and a "moment of silence" as secular even though today 
both serve the functions of traditional prayer. 
In each of the above cases the Court, as in the days of 
Jefferson and Mann, confronts religion as an obstacle to the 
effective facilitation of the public school system. Yet, the Court, 
rather than seeking some common ground as Jefferson and 
Mann sought, has striven to completely exclude religion from 
the public school arena. 
D. Incorporation Doctrine 
One might attempt to explain these different approaches to 
the same problem in terms of the incorporation doctrine. In 
other words, Jefferson and Mann did not have the First 
Amendment mandating a "wall of separation" between church 
and state because the Fourteenth Amendment either was un-
available or had not yet been interpreted to "incorporate" the 
First Amendment, thus, making the First Amendment applica-
ble to the states. Since this "incorporation" the Court has been 
much more absolute in its rejection of religious precepts in the 
public schools. The incorporation reasoning alone, however, 
does not provide an entirely satisfactory explanation for the 
Court's almost universal rejection of religion in the public 
school setting. 
While the incorporation doctrine adds a new twist to an old 
debate, it need not completely eradicate the usefulness of his-
torical references. Historical references provide evidences that 
the Establishment Clause has not been interpreted to preclude 
religion from all aspects of publi.c life. For example, in 
Bradfield v. Roberts122 the Supreme Court held that a federal 
government contract with the Catholic Sisters of Charity to run 
a hospital did not violate the Establishment Clause. However, 
the Court has struck down as violative of the Establishment 
Clause statutes that provided supplements for the salaries of 
teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary 
122. 175 u.s. 291 (1899). 
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schools. 123 The distinction between these two cases cannot be 
explained by reference to the Establishment Clause. 
Moreover, it cannot reasonably be argued that the ratifiers 
expected the Establishment Clause to mean that religion and 
the public classroom must be completely bifurcated, especially 
given the pervading notion that religion was necessary to the 
advancement of civil society. The First Congress, it should be 
remembered, passed the Northwest Ordinance indicating that a 
relationship between religion and schools was acceptable in the 
same session they passed the Bill of Rights containing the 
Establishment Clause language. Additionally, the First Con-
gress passed a law requiring the opening of Congress with an 
invocation. By analogy, it borders on the inane to argue that 
the Establishment Clause is intended to eradicate all aspects of 
religion from public life. Thus, the question once again becomes 
"when does an establishment of religion take place?'' 
The ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, through which 
the First Amendment became applicable to the states, enjoyed 
many of the activities in public schools, prayer, Bible reading 
and religious oriented instruction, that today's courts have 
found to violate the Establishment Clause. The question re-
mains, why does modern society interpret the Establishment 
Clause to require absolute separation of religion and the class-
room? While analyzing modern thought as reflected in case 
law, one must look beyond the Establishment Clause applica-
tion to the Establishment Clause interpretation and how and 
why that differs with historical perspectives. 
In fact, a closer look at the Court's decisions reveals that 
they are not much different from the approach Jefferson and 
Mann espoused. In essence, Jefferson articulated universal 
principles of a religious nature and labeled them non-sectarian. 
Today, the Court chooses those virtues not necessary to the 
success of public education and labels them religious. The Es-
tablishment Clause is a tool that can be used to issue decrees 
on what is and is not appropriate for public school curriculum. 
The problem, of course, is that this no longer resolves the di-
lemma of whose religion receives airtime in the public schools. 
Society has become so pluralistic that universal precepts are no 
longer self-evident. Therefore, alienation is inevitable. 
123. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
The preceding sections display an incredible dilemma. 
Public schools are necessary to promote cultural adhesion and 
foster individual growth, thus creating a more productive soci-
ety. Moreover, the schools want and need to promote a free 
market-place of ideas. Morals or values are a fundamental part 
of any culture and are necessary to the well-being of the indi-
viduals within that culture. Yet, parents entrust their children 
to the schools with the understanding that the schools will not 
promote values inconsistent with those of the parents. Addi-
tionally, the schools must be careful not to violate the Estab-
lishment and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment, 
which protect all individuals from invasions upon the freedom 
of conscience. 124 Thus, to effectively accomplish their purpose 
the schools must articulate morals and values consistent with 
the cultural goals of the school and yet not violate the First 
Amendment. The courts can overcome this dilemma in four 
ways: 1) define religion in a universally acceptable way, 2) 
overtum the incorporation doctrine and allow the states more 
flexibility, 3) define those values necessary to the culture as 
non-religious, or 4) define "establishment" as something more 
than mere presentation, thus allowing a wider variety of mor-
als and viewpoints to be taught. 
The first and second options are unlikely to occur in the 
near future. The definition of religion is clearly cultural and 
the culture is in a state of continuous flux. Consequently, even 
assuming a definition could be articulated, it would likely be 
brittle and shatter when held against the changing tide of 
societal norms. Overturning the incorporation doctrine would 
be difficult because it has been a part of American jurispru-
dence and American culture for such a long time. Should the 
Court seek to advance this goal, it would allow the states more 
control and promote greater cultural commitment. The danger 
in this approach is that minority religious views would be sub-
ject to the whim of the majority. 
The third option is the one the courts have chosen as ex-
emplified throughout this paper. Justice O'Connor articulates 
this point well when she states, 
124. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 39 (1985). 
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it is inevitable that the secular interests of government and 
the religious interests of various sects and their adherents 
will frequently intersect, conflict and combine .... Chaos 
would ensue if every such statute were invalid under the 
Establishment Clause. For example, the State could not 
criminalize murder for fear that it would thereby promote the 
Biblical command against killing."125 
111 
What Justice O'Connor and the courts have refused to acknowl-
edge is that the only reason the biblical command against kill-
ing does not violate the Establishment Clause is because, on a 
fundamental level, unjustified homicide breaches virtually 
everyone's moral code. Thus, no one complains that religion has 
been established. This is similar to Jefferson's approach to 
divisive sects-find some principle upon which the sects will not 
divide. 
The problem of defining a precept as non-religious is that 
eventually the definer steps outside the universal moral code, 
someone disagrees and then uses the First Amendment to have 
the precept excluded from public discourse. Today, that univer-
sal moral code contains fewer and fewer shared precepts, in-
creasing the likelihood that the definer will step into the realm 
of the offensive. A societal alienation is inevitable. 
This alienation occurs because whoever defines the values 
necessary to the culture, labels those values "non-religious" 
providing those values with access to the public domain. How-
ever, those values labeled "religious" are excluded from the 
public domain and thus values necessary to specific segments 
of the population may be excluded. This alienates those seg-
ments, inevitably reshaping society's cultural makeup. As Jus-
tice Clark explained, "[ w ]hen government, ... allies itself with 
one particular form of religion the inevitable result is that it 
incurs 'the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who 
held contrary beliefs."'126 Aside from alienation, labeling cer-
tain morals or methods as religious and thus excluding them 
also results in intolerance and a restriction of the free-market-
place of ideas that is necessary to public schools. 
The Court, in refining the purpose of the First Amendment 
religion clause, explains that "the political interest in forestall-
ing intolerance extends beyond intolerance among Christian 
125. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
126. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 221-2 (quoting Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 
(1962). 
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sects-or even intolerance among 'religions'-to encompass 
intolerance of the disbeliever and the uncertain."127 Yet, the 
Court has repeatedly been intolerant of traditional, religious 
views, presented in any form in the public schools. Consequent-
ly, those who follow traditionally defined religions are excluded, 
in the name of tolerance, while the hesitant and uncertain are 
permitted to preach or at least share their doubt with children 
in the public schools, all the while demanding the exclusion of 
traditional religion. 
Intolerance towards traditional, religious views is reflected 
in the moral breakdown occurring throughout the nation. Ac-
cording to the National Crime Survey, almost three million 
crimes occur on or near school campuses every year. 128 One-
fourth of major urban school districts now use metal 
detectors. 129 Almost one-third of the students in 31 high 
schools in Illinois said they had brought a weapon to school for 
self-protection at some time during their high school ca-
reer.130 One in twenty said they had brought a gun. 131 
Clearly, the above statistics reflect a lessening respect for life 
and property which is a primary Judea-Christian value. One 
look at the pervasiveness of drug use, teenage pregnancy, or 
political corruption and one can sense the result of an increas-
ing intolerance for traditional values such as respect for one's 
body, abstinence, and honesty. 
Some might claim that the courts are only alienating the 
intolerant, and, by definition, a tolerant society will necessarily 
eliminate or alienate such a segment of its population. Howev-
er, while it is true intolerant people exist, it can hardly be said 
those who request that creation-science be taught when evolu-
tion is taught, or that the Bible be used as a source of moral 
reference when other books are so used, or that a moment be 
permitted for prayer when a moment is permitted for medita-
tion are intolerant fanatics. Those who attempt to exclude such 
practices are closing the free-market on ideas that have influ-
enced history and still continue to pervade society. 
127. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 54. 
128. Tom Morganthau et al., It's Not Just New York, Newsweek, March 9, 
1992, at 25. 
129. ld. 
130. ld. 
131. ld. 
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America's classrooms are propounded as free-markets 
where ideas can be explored, compared, and bartered. Yet, 
those who follow traditional religions are told to check their 
ideas at the schoolhouse door. This, in effect, closes the door on 
examination of the bedrock principles that caused the founding 
fathers to act. In philosophical, political, and literary discus-
sions, students and teachers should be permitted to refer to 
traditional, religious viewpoints for understanding and instruc-
tion. These viewpoints pervade history and many modern com-
munities throughout America. When these views are excluded, 
students are denied an opportunity to understand what makes 
their world work. This is not an apology for the teaching of 
religious doctrine in the classroom. It is a call for freedom to 
compete. Many ideas involving societal structure involve reli-
giously oriented suppositions, for example, the idea that "we 
are endowed by our Creator with certain inalienable rights." 
Communities that value these ideas should be permitted to 
present them to their children. Under the current approach to 
the Establishment Clause, they cannot. 
The fourth option, redefining establishment, would prohibit 
the courts from intervening until the violation was more harm-
ful, thus allowing local communities to work out their value 
systems and the way those values are presented in public 
schools. For example, the mere presentation or existence of a 
religious view should not violate the First Amendment. A sin-
gle comparison of the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Speech Clause will illustrate. Justice Jackson has stated that 
"[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation it 
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by work or act their faith 
therein."132 The Court has ruled that funding certain political 
speech does not violate the First Amendment. 133 If funding 
political speech does not "prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics," then funding religious speech does not dictate what 
shall be orthodox in religion. 134 
132, Board of Educ. v, Barnette, 319 U,S, 624, 642 (1943). 
133, Buckley v, Valeo, 424 U.S, 1 (1976). 
134, For further comparison of Freedom of Speech jurisprudence and freedom 
of religion jurisprudence see Michael W, McConnell, Political and Religious Dises-
tablishment, 1986 BYU. L, REV. 405, 
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Returning some control of the definition of religion to local 
communities is a desired result because it promotes cultural 
adhesion. This would allow a definition of religion according to 
values indigenous to a particular community. There is a reason 
people may choose to live in Boise, Idaho over Harlem, New 
York or vice versa. Individuals will gravitate towards areas 
where values most closely resemble their own. Perhaps some 
school districts will resolve to exclude religion in a manner 
consistent with the last thirty years of Supreme Court deci-
sions. If so, it will be because the community has made that 
decision, not because the decision was forced upon them by five 
people in Washington D.C. Thus, alienation will be less likely 
and community adhesion will be more probable. Compare this 
outcome with that of an Afro-centric curriculum. If people have 
a right to control their cultural destiny, they should likewise 
have the right to control their moral destiny. 
The short-coming with returning control to the local level 
is that individuals within communities may be alienated. This 
is the precise result the Bill of Rights was intended to prevent. 
However, the individuals need not feel alienated. The Courts 
could still enjoin coercion. Individuals would still be free to 
worship (or not worship) how they pleased. The only people 
truly excluded are those who are intolerant of the community's 
values. Society permits this type of exclusion, else a criminal 
justice system would be non-existent, and the civil rights move-
ment would have been impossible. History shows that such a 
result would not promote intolerance. For examples one need 
look no further than the disestablishment movement in the 
states during the early nineteenth century or the evolution 
towards non-sectarian schools in the mid-nineteenth century, 
all of which occurred without the help of the Establishment 
Clause and the Supreme Court. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In failing to provide a concrete definition of the terms "reli-
gion" and "secular," the courts are free to conclude that in pub-
lic schools a person may not teach evidence substantiating the 
traditionally religious view of a Supreme Creator, but one may 
teach a world-view that excludes the existence of a Supreme 
Creator or an after-life. Likewise, the courts are free to con-
clude that the legislature may not proscribe a theory that hu-
mankind evolved from an amoeba, but neither may the legisla-
ture balance such instruction with evidence which supports the 
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traditionally religious view of a Supreme Creator. Moreover, 
this vague approach permits the courts to reason that forbid-
ding the view that mortality is the end of existence violates 
academic freedom and "postpones education," whereas permit-
ting views which depend on the existence of eternity is uncon-
stitutional. 
Admittedly, religious instruction as well as the definition 
of religion are at once pervasive and personal. For this reason 
it is imperative that the paradox regarding religious instruction 
in public schools be resolved, to some extent, on the local level 
where a consensus can be reached and community values can 
be preserved. If a change occurs, it is a change the community 
chooses rather than a change externally imposed. To do other-
wise eviscerates the meaning of "community." 
